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INTRODUCTION
Most business professionals concur that the independent auditor should be held
financially accountable for instances of auditor fraud or intentional deceit involving scienter.
However, two very dramatic and different views emerge when the independent auditor's
negligence and its legal ramifications are discussed. The financial statement auditor wants
liability limited solely to parties in privity of contract while the third party financial statement
user wants liability expanded to include all reasonably foreseeable parties.
This paper will begin with a brief overview of the research methodology used to
gather the information contained throughout this honors project. This paper will then explain
the background of the public accounting profession and will provide a brief overview of the
auditor's contractual as well as tort liability for negligence. Next, the paper will discuss two
dramatically opposing legal doctrines--strict contractual privity and reasonably foreseeable
third party--and the viewpoints of the two opposing parties--the financial statement auditors
and the third party financial statement users. Then, other "middle-of-the-road" legal
doctrines will be examined. The paper will conclude with the author's opinion of the
liability crisis and suggest potential ways to rectify the legal liability crisis--thus closing the
expectation gap.
This Honors Capstone was written to critically assess recent case-law and judicial
decisions surrounding the financial statement auditor's legal liability for negligence. At the
conclusion of this assessment, I will formulate a conclusion about which viewpoints and
which judicial rulings will lead to my ideal compromise--allow for a prosperous accounting
profession while still allowing injured investors to recover damages for actual audit failures.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The initial step in the research process was an extensive literature review. The
purpose of this review was to obtain infonnation from accountancy and law journals that
would accurately and fairly present the two opposing viewpoints. In addition, interviews
were conducted to supplement the data gathered through the literature review. The interview
process was designed to enhance the contrast that exists between the two opposing parties.
Interviews were conducted with three representatives from Big Six public accounting finns
and with two attorneys who were chosen to represent the third party financial statement
users. The interviews ranged in length from one hour to one and one-half hours.
The questionnaire used to conduct the interviews is attached to the Capstone paper as
Appendix A. The questionnaire was designed to confonn with the various major subsections
of the paper as well as to provide useful infonnation to the interviewer. Many of the
questions correspond directly to Capstone paper headings while others merely enhance the
interviewer's understanding of the point-of-view being discussed.
BACKGROUND
Reasonable vs. Absolute Assurance
The financial statement audit has evolved significantly throughout its history. Nearly
a century ago, public accounting emerged as a byproduct of the Great Depression. Its
primary purpose was to aid in rebuilding the economy and spurring investor confidence
(Pasewark 26). At that time, auditors provided virtually absolute assurance against
management fraud and intentional mismanagement (Epstein & Geiger 60). Today, auditors
provide only reasonable assurance--as dictated by the professional standards. Unfortunately,
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assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement. More than 70
percent of the general public expect independent auditors to provide absolute assurance that
no fraud has been perpetrated (Epstein & Geiger 63-64). The prevailing public opinion--as
reflected in this study--falls into direct conflict with the auditor's professional responsibility
to provide only reasonable assurance. The contemporary audit, by both nature and
definition, is not designed to provide absolute assurance in any area. The evidence
overwhelmingly suggests that the public's expectations surpass current standards and, as a
result, a severe expectation gap exists.
The attorneys interviewed see evidence of an expectation gap in today's society. One
of the lawyers interviewed believes that the general public is "lazy" in that they choose to
rely on the public accountant to protect them from faulty business decisions instead of relying
on their own business sense. Accordingly, he wants the public to accept responsibility for
their own "clumsy" decisions rather than pass the blame onto the public accounting
profession.
In the early 1970's, Victor Earle, general counsel of the former Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. (now KPMG Peat Marwick) described what he believed to be the five root
causes of public misperception. First, the public does not understand the scope of the audit.
The public erroneously expects the auditor to perform a 100 percent examination of financial
statement records and uncover all instances of error or misconduct. Second, the public does
not understand the intended outcome of the audit process. The public expects the auditor to
evaluate the wisdom and legality of a company's decisions rather than the company's
financial statements and management representations. Third, the public does not understand
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losses should be compensable by someone" --usually the public accountant (Minow 72).
Currently, the public accounting profession is plagued by meritless lawsuits and, as a result,
is in the midst of a litigation crisis.
The Independent Auditor as a Defendant
Our litigious society has created an ever-growing liability crisis in most service
industries--including public accounting. Some believe that public accounting firms are
subject to numerous litigation claims because, quite simply, they make good targets. After
all, it is likely that they will have, at some point during the audit, made errors or omitted
information. In addition, public accounting firms, through liability insurance policies, have
very "deep pockets." The corporation's individual directors and officers are not likely to
have liability insurance that covers their own fraudulent activities (Broom & Brown 31). In
today's society, it appears that the "highest good of a legal system is its capacity to shift
losses" to those with deep pockets or sufficient liability insurance (Minow 72). One of the
lawyers interviewed believes that the public accounting firms are "easy targets" because they
are visibly linked to the audit report via their signed opinion. Since auditors are forced to do
their work "up front and in center stage," users can see their work product and rely heavily
upon it.
Overview of Contractual Liability
After entering into a legal contract, the public accountant is bound to perform all of
the duties explicitly stated and agreed upon in the contract. The accountant implicitly agrees
to uphold the standards that are generally accepted in the profession--namely Generally
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Accepted Auditing Stap.rlards (GAAS)--and to perfonn the audit with the same care expected
of a reasonably skilled professional (Mann et al 1030).
Any public accountant who breaches the professional service contract may be held
liable not only to his client, but also to certain third party beneficiaries. A third party
beneficiary is a non-contracting party designated by the contracting parties to receive the
primary benefit (the audit report) under the contract (Mann et al 1032).
Differing De~rees of Tort Liabilitv
An accountant is negligent when he does not exercise the degree of care that a
reasonably competent accountant would exercise under identical circumstances. An
accountant, however, is not liable under the negligence theory for honest inaccuracies or
errors in judgement as long as he exercised reasonable care while fulfilling his duties.
Further, an accountant does not--and needs not--guarantee the accuracy of his reports
provided that he acts in a reasonably competent, professional manner (Mann et aI1032).
An accountant may commit a fraudulent act while conducting a financial statement
audit or while preparing the audit report. Fraud is difficult to prove because there are
specific required elements that must be present for an act to be deemed a fraud. To
summarize the criteria, the auditor must have falsely represented a material fact, known that
the fact was indeed false, and intentionally deceived another party. The other party must
have justifiably relied upon the statement, and, as a result, been injured by the plaintiff.
Fraud is an intentional act that involves scienter, forethought, or malice. It is imperative that




In the past, judicial decisions concerning the independent auditor's legal liability
hinged on the traditional notion of privity of contract--a legally enforceable relationship that
results between two contractual parties. No parties who are outside of the actual legal
contract--except for third party beneficiaries, as described below--are able to prevail in a case
involving auditor negligence. Instead, auditors are liable only for instances of fraud where
scienter and forethought--as well as the other essential elements--are involved (Henry 322).
The implied duty not to prepare a fraudulent audit report extends to third party beneficiaries
if the accountants were notified that the client intended to distribute the report to said third
parties (Henry 322, Hanson & Gillett 29).
The strict privity approach was adopted many decades ago in Ultramares v. Touche.
This landmark case is often viewed as being overly protective of the auditor--to the detriment
of the general public (Hanson & Gillett 29). Judge Benjamin Cordozo limited the auditor's
legal liability for negligence dramatically. His decision hinged on the aforementioned notion
of contractual privity. In his opinion, "if liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose the accountants to a liability in an indeterminant amount for an indeterminant time to
an indeterminant class." The judge's reasoning is clear: he did not want the independent
public accounting profession to be indeterminately liable.
The public accountants interviewed admit that the strict privity approach unfairly
favors their profession. One interviewee adds that the entire public accounting profession is
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fearful of the intense litigation being brought against them. The profession does not favor
the privity approach because they think it is fair and appropriate; rather, the profession
favors it because they are scared and feel it is the only way to curb the litigation and ensure
the long-term viability of the firms. Another interviewee believes that strict privity would
not protect the auditor as much as the lay public thinks. He feels that the crux of the privity
approach is its ability to make the court process very cumbersome. He argues that in order
for a third party to sue the auditor, the third party would have to sue the client who would
have to sue the client's management who would then be allowed to sue the financial
statement auditor.
The attorneys interviewed agree that the strict contractual privity approach is
inappropriate. They believe that it is overly-rigid and unfairly favors the financial statement
auditor. One attorney believes that since the intended beneficiaries of the audit report are the
multitude of third party users, the client should not be the only party allowed to "enforce the
law." The group of intended beneficiaries should be protected under the law.
Reasons to Limit Liability
Auditors, like many other service-oriented professionals, vehemently argue that
restrictions should be placed on the extent of legal liability for negligence. They support
their position with a variety of reasons. The most basic reason relates to the auditing
standards themselves. The standards do not, nor should they be misconstrued to, place the
auditor in a position to serve as a fraud or misrepresentation detector.
Many believe that allowing public opinion to overshadow the professional regulations
lead to the confusion of both parties. One accountant thinks that the auditor's performance is
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excellent yet does not meet society's needs. He believes that an equilibrium must be reached
that balances public policy benefits with audit costs.
In addition, the public accountants who were interviewed feel that passing the cost
burden onto the public accounting profession serves only to increase the cost of auditing
services. Some believe that if third parties (who lack contractual privity) plan to rely upon
an audit report, they should hire their own public accountant. Then, they could hold their
auditor liable for negligence since they will have engaged in a contractual privity relationship
(Hanson and Gillett 30).
Limiting the auditor's legal liability would also profoundly affect the way that the
profession operates. For example, too often, firms are forced into settlements via "legalized
extortion" attempts. Legal costs are far lower if an out-of-court settlement is reached by the
parties (on average approximately $2.7 million) than if the dispute was settled in a court of
law (on average approximately $3.5 million).
Accountants are hopeful that further limitations will decrease the turnover rates in
public accounting and enable the firms to retain their highest-quality personnel. Recent
studies indicate that between 37 percent and 63 percent of partners leave public accounting
partially as a result of increasing litigation claims. In addition, between 8 and 40 percent of
audit managers leave public accounting for similar reasons (Dalton et al 55). Auditing
professionals believe that when specific groups are targeted by extensive litigation, the result
is a scarcity of practitioners in that area (Cook et al).
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Proportionate Liability
Currently, the legal system operates under a joint & several liability doctrine. One
defendant, found guilty of negligence or fraud, may be forced to pay the entire damage
judgement if the other defendants cannot. Each defendant is held fully liable for the assessed
damages in a case--regardless of the personal degree of fault exhibited.
Under proportionate liability, damages would be assessed to each defendant according
to their comparative degree of responsibility for the failure. Proportionate liability
proponents believe that such a measure would restore balance and equity to the legal system
by discouraging frivolous, meritless suits. Both sides of any valid lawsuit desire these
objectives. Plaintiffs do not want to be seen as frivolous, money-hungry opportunists and
auditors do not want to be held any more financially responsible than they were
professionally irresponsible. Auditors have a vested interest in the proportionate liability
approach since rarely has an independent auditor been held more at fault for a business
failure than the client and its management (Kiernan & Lewin 40).
Auditing professionals believe that their desire for an end to joint & several liability is
not an attempt to escape financial responsibility. When they are entirely to blame, they are
willing to accept financial responsibility. When they are not entirely to blame, however,
they want to be held liable only for their proportionate share (Cook et al). Further, some
accounting professionals believe that proportionate liability is the fairest doctrine because it
eliminates one of the incentives for frivolous lawsuits--the selection of "deep pocket"
defendants. The reward to an unscrupulous plaintiff is lowered by limiting the "deep
pocket's" proportionate blame. One accountant interviewed believes that the public
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accounting world would not fear litigation as much as it does currently and may not settle
lawsuits as often as it does under joint & several liability if proportionate liability was
enacted. The risk of financial loss becomes more manageable when a firm is responsible for
only their own part of the plaintiffs' total harm.
Some states have adopted a modified version of the proportionate liability approach.
They place the plaintiff additionally "at-risk" for any proportionate liability attributable to a
"defendant" that was not sued (Kiernan & Lewin 40).
One of the lawyers interviewed opposes joint & several liability . He favors the
notion of comparative negligence over proportionate liability. Under comparative
negligence, damages are awarded in proportion to the degree of fault exhibited. In addition,
only the fault of the user and of the auditor should be assessed. He does not believe that the
client's management should be held liable. After all, it was the auditor who was hired to
catch managerial perpetrators.
Limitation of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are fines awarded in civil cases after the injured party's need for
compensation has been fully established (Geoghan 47). Under statutory and common law,
the imposition of such damages requires a finding of willfulness much stronger than
negligence or reckless mistake. The Supreme Court has "flirted" with the constitutional
questions raised by the unlimited punitive damage awards (Kiernan & Lewin 41). A study
conducted by the Institute of Civil Justice documented that the average punitive damage
award increased over 1600 percent from the time period 1965-1969 to the time period 1980-
1984 (Geoghan 48).
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An AICPA subcommittee working with ATRA (a Washington D.C. based advocacy
group) encouraged punitive damage legislation based on the United States Supreme Court
ruling in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip. In this case, the Court limited the juror's
discretion in setting punitive damage amounts. In the past, jurors had been given little or no
guidance in determining the adequate amount of damages (Geoghan 48). ATRA believes that
claimants who seek punitive damages should be required to prove malicious or intentional
misconduct involving scienter.
ATRA would like to have punitive damages awarded in a separate proceeding that
would take place after the compensatory damages have been awarded. Requiring a separate
hearing by a new jury would eliminate any jury bias that emerged during the first trial. At
this separate hearing, the presiding court would review jury awards and assess their
reasonableness.
AICPA model legislation attempts to limit the dollar amount of punitive damages.
The upper limit, they believe, should be tied to the defendant's actual or expected gain from
the wrongdoing. When enacted in the past, however, such damage caps have been
overturned on state constitutional grounds (Geoghan 48).
One accountant interviewed believes that punitive damages are a necessary part of the
legal system. He thinks that all punitive damages should serve their primary purpose by
monetarily punishing the culpable firms. He does not, however, believe that the plaintiffs--
or their lawyers--should be the recipients of the punitive damage awards. He would like to
see the money paid to the appropriate governmental regulatory agency so that the government
can have additional funds available to investigate and stop further misdeeds.
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Foreseeable Third Party Approach-- The Third Party's Choice
An auditor's legal liability is greatly expanded under the reasonably foreseeable third
party approach. Reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs are neither known to the accountant nor
are they members of a class of intended recipients. Instead, they include anyone whom the
accountant may reasonably foresee as a possible user of the financial statements. If an
auditor commits a tort, he should be completely liable for all the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of his actions (Mann et al1032). This new theory, as shown below, seems to
hold the public accountant responsible for a client's business that doesn't properly function
and for the losses that result (Minow 72).
In Rosenblum v. Adler, investor-plaintiffs acquired stock in a corporation whose
financial statements were later found to be fraudulent. As a result of the fraud, the newly
purchased stock became worthless. Although no relationship between the auditor and the
third party existed, the auditor's liability was extended to the foreseeable third party
purchasers. In its decision, the court noted that liability insurance was available to
accounting firms and that the cost of such insurance was not prohibitive.
The extension of liability to foreseeable third parties may encourage careful and
thorough reviews as well as place the burden of detection on the party most able to prevent
it--the auditor. More specifically, "generally, within the outer limits fixed by the court as a
matter of law, the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the negligent act define the duty
and should be actionable" (Henry 323-4).
In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt, & Co., the financial statements, which were
eventually used to obtain bank financing, contained material misstatements. The accountants
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denied any knowledge that the financial statements were to be used for this purpose. The
Wisconsin court held that legal liability could be avoided only if strong public policy
considerations required such avoidance. The consideration of public policy ramifications
usually ends with the conclusion that, since liability insurance is available and since its cost
is not prohibitive, public policy need not be changed (Henry 324).
Similarly, in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., the
Court of Appeals reversed an earlier court decision and adopted the expansive foreseeable
third party approach (Henry 324). Judge Trotter believed that the "protectionist rule of
privity announced in Ultramares v. Touche was no longer viable because the role of the
accountant in our modem society has changed. At the time of Ultramares v. Touche, the
primary obligation of the auditor was to the client who hired him or her to detect fraud or
embezzlement by the client's employees.. .The accountant (independent auditor) today
occupies a position of public trust" (Mann et al1036-7).
In accordance with the reasonably foreseeable approach, in Spherex, Inc, v. Alexander
Grant and Co., the judge compared the auditor's legal liability to the manufacturer's product
liability. He felt thought that "[A]n accountant, like the manufacturer of a product under
product liability law, is .in the best position to regulate the effects of his conduct by
controlling the degree of care exercised during the performance of his professional duty.
The accountant, through the fee structure, can pass along to his clients the cost of insuring
against financial loss sustained by them through reliance upon his negligent misstatement of
fact" (Minow 77).
With regard to the foreseeable third party approach, opinions vary within the legal
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profession. One lawyer interviewed believes that the foreseeable approach is too broad. The
other believes the approach "favors both parties equally since the auditor is not liable unless
he is negligent. If he doesn't act negligently, he won't have any liability to the foreseeable
class.. .too often, the auditors have a self-serving rationale and view themselves as accounting
gods" whose mistakes should not carry any repercussions. However, he does believe that
auditor mistakes have the capacity to hurt a multitude of innocent people and should carry
severe repercussions. "The public accounting profession should not be immunized against
their own misdeeds. "
The public accounting profession does not believe that the foreseeable third party
approach is appropriate. One accountant interviewed thinks that the legal system is "broken"
and, as a result, is not correctly balancing the needs of the two opposing parties. Until
balance is restored to the system, the foreseeable approach should not be followed. Another
accountant opposes distribution of the financial statements and the accompanying audit report
to unknown third parties. Under this scenario, the user's specific needs are unknown. .
Further, the auditor has no opportunity to explain any aspect of the audit to the user because
all third party questions are directed to management--who has a vested interest in the
answers. Since the auditor is not permitted to contact the user, he has no opportunity to
advise the user or to help the user interpret the data. Too many users do not understand the
audit report and fail to understand that the financial statements were examined by assessing
materiality to the statements as a whole--which generally produces vastly different results
than if materiality was assessed for each division or line item.
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Reasons to Expand Liability
Proponents of liability expansion feel strongly that the auditor's legal liability should
be expanded to protect third party financial statement users. They believe that the general
public needs protection from deceptive financial statements. Since the accountants are in the
best position to detect corporate fraud, it is only right that the risk of loss falls upon them.
After all, they are the party who was best able to deter the loss. And since the accounting
profession has extensive liability insurance, it is best able to bear the financial losses which
result from misleading financial statements.
Further, an expansion of liability will benefit public accountants by calling them to
respond with higher-quality audit practices (Hanson and Gillett 30). Members of the legal
profession believe that auditors do not always perform at a sufficiently high level of quality.
They want to see the auditors perform as other reasonably competent accountants would.
They believe that, too often, the accountants do not want to reveal the true nature of the
financial statements in the audit opinion--they would rather please the client.
In fact, some believe that auditors should be held increasingly responsible for audit
failures. They think that the reality of facing inevitable and serious consequences for their
negligent actions may spur the auditing profession to raise the overall quality of audit
performance. An auditor should not, when confronted with an audit failure, graciously reply
that an audit cannot be expected to detect all material misstatements. In general, third party
investors believe that an auditor's recital of the inherent limitations of an audit are
unreasonable excuses for negligent behavior. In their eyes, based on the lack of assurance
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provided by the auditor's opinion, the audit itself seems only to have merely "skimmed the
surface" of the client's financial statements (1993b).
Joint & Several Liability
As mentioned above, the current legal system operates under a joint & several
liability system. Joint and several liability seemingly favors the plaintiff. In the end, the
damages awarded will be paid by someone (Cook et al 1992).
One lawyer interviewed believes that compensation of the injured plaintiff is of
primary importance. He contends that joint & several liability is appropriate if it ensures
compensation of the injured plaintiff. In fact, he believes that a proportionate liability system
already exists in the form of subsequent lawsuits against co-defendants.
Continuation of Punitive Damage Awards
One of the lawyers interviewed does not believe that punitive damage awards should
be limited. He adds that negligence never establishes punitive damage awards--only willful
misconduct does. He also states that punitive damages are awarded in only a small subset of
cases and that the accountants should stop "exaggerating the issue."
Chan!!es Over Time
Over time, the privity approach was dispelled and new judicial rulings emerged. To
the auditor, these rulings seemed overly-protective of third party financial statement users
and neglected the rights of the independent auditors.
The legal system has recently begun to fulfill its rightful role as "watchdog" for the
general public while still adequately limiting the auditor's legal liability to situations in which
an actual audit failure occurred. In an attempt to fully define and decide the extent of
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liability created between the auditor and the third party financial statement user, the courts
have established several new judicial doctrines. Precedents established in early cases have
been replaced by new--and drastically different--precedents.
Balancing Factors Doctrine
Under the Balancing Factors Doctrine, the judicial system is responsible for
evaluating several key factors that relate to the case's specific fact pattern before a decision
is rendered. These factors include (a) the extent to which the transaction was intended to
harm the plaintiff, (b) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (c) the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff was actually injured, (d) the closeness of the relationship between the
defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injury, (e) the actual injury suffered, (f) the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (g) the future policy that will be established
by the ruling (Sager 27). This approach considers the financial statement assurances desired
by the third party user as well as the professional responsibilities required of the independent
accountant. It strikes a balance between the two by requiring the legal system to consider
relevant information that may have been previously overlooked.
Near Privity
The Near-Privity Doctrine established in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co. defined the criteria used to establish whether a third party should be considered in "near
privity" of contract. A third party is considered in near privity if (a) the accountants were
made aware that the financial statements were to be used for a particular purpose, (b) the
third party user was known by the accountants to actually rely on the statements, and (c) the
accountant's conduct linked them to that party in a manner that "evinces the accountant's
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understanding" of third party reliance (Wootton and Moore 35).
If deemed to be in near privity, the plaintiff may recover for professional negligence.
In essence, the third party is treated as though they were a party to the original contract; they
are owed the same degree of care and financial accountability as the original party.
Second Restatement of Torts §552
The Second Restatement expands an auditor's legal liability for negligence to a limited
group of third parties for whose benefit the audit report was prepared. The accountant must
know of the client's intent to distribute the report to third parties. If the group of third
parties is small, the auditor does not need to know the identity of each individual group
member as long as the auditor realizes that a small group does exist (Henry 323).
Rusch Factors v. Levin was a landmark case under the Restatement. The auditors
knew that the purpose of the audit report was to help Levin obtain financing from Rusch
Factors. The financial statements and their accompanying audit report indicated that the
corporation was solvent, when, in fact, it was not (Henry 323). District Judge Pettine relied
heavily upon the accountant's undisputed knowledge of the report's purpose in reaching his
verdict. He displayed the following attitude: "Why should an innocent, reliant party be
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the
risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risks onto its customers, who can,
in turn, pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?"
Haddon View Investment Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand involved a similar situation. The
accountant was held liable to the limited partners in a partnership for which the accountant's
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services were performed. The State Supreme Court ruled that the accountant should be held
liable for professional negligence to a foreseen third party when that party is a member of a
limited class whose reliance on the accountant's representation is specifically foreseen (Henry
323).
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James was another significant case. In this case, the
accountant was liable when he supplied a false audit report since a third party investor was
specifically known to him (Henry 323).
Foreseen Users Approach
The Foreseen Users Approach is similar to the above-mentioned Restatement of
Torts. It expands the class of protected individuals to those whom the accountant knew
would use the work product or those who use the accountant's work for a purpose which the
accountant knew it would be used. For example, if the auditor knew that the client intended
to use the audit financial statements and accompanying audit report to obtain financing from
a specified bank, the auditor is liable to the specific bank as well as any other bank who
relied upon--and was financially damaged by--an erroneous, negligently-prepared report.
The class of protected individuals, although expanded under this approach, does not include
potential investors and the general public (Mann et al 1032).
One of the attorneys interviewed believes that the foreseen third party approach is the
"ideal" judicial ruling. He feels that the auditor should be held liable to the extent of the




The Illinois Approach to auditor's liability, which began as a bill to amend the Illinois
Public Accounting Act in 1986, revolves around two fundamental exceptions to the
traditional privity doctrine. Liability is expanded to include (1) victims of accountant fraud
or intentional misrepresentation and (2) parties identified in writing as intending to rely on
the financial statements. A strange twist to this approach requires the auditor to personally
identify all potential users, compose a listing, and then circulate the listing to all those
identified. The accountant must, in good faith, inquire about and fairly identify all relevant
third parties. Some argue that this approach overlooks the small, unsophisticated investor
who relies on the auditor's financial statement opinion without any knowledge of the written
notice requirement (Henry 325-327).
California Case against Arthur Young
On August 28, 1992, the California Supreme Court sharply limited the liability of
auditors under its jurisdiction. In this case, a group of investors bought warrants to purchase
stock in a small computer company, Osborne Computer Corp. The investment's timing
coincided with a technological breakthrough by IBM. When Osborne failed, the investors
claimed that the auditors had been negligent throughout the audit and sued (Schmitt Bl).
During deliberations, the court recognized that "investment decisions are by their very
nature complex and multifaceted, and often have little to do with the audit report." The
Court's judgement hinged on the assumption that only actual clients can recover damages for
an auditor's professional negligence. Other claimants are prohibited from filing suit unless
they can demonstrate fraudulent or deceptive actions on the part of the auditor (Schmitt B1).
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In essence, the ruling reinstated the above-mentioned privity doctrine which takes a
conservative approach to legal liability. The ruling was welcomed enthusiastically by public
accountants and was jeered by financial statement users.
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver established yet another
judicial doctrine. The court's decision in this case, in effect, relieved an "aider and abettor"
from legal liability by concluding that only a primary wrongdoer could suffer legal reprimand
and repercussions for their actions (Hanson and Rockness 41). Although this case did not
specifically involve the public accounting profession, the precedent it established is expected
to greatly limit the extent to which auditors may be found liable to third party financial
statement users under Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Bilv v. Arthur Young
Under this approach, the parties to whom accountants are liable differ under fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and professional negligence. In the instance of fraud, every
foreseeable user who was actually misled is protected. In the instance of negligent
misrepresentation, foreseen parties are protected. In the instance of professional negligence,
the privity doctrine is upheld (Wootton & Moore 42).
THE LITIGATION CRISIS
Author's Opinion
Throughout this paper, I critically assessed the various approaches to the financial
statement auditor's legal liability for negligence--ranging from the Strict Privity approach to
the Reasonably Foreseeable Third Party approach.
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Based on this assessment, I believe that the Foreseen Third Party approach is most
appropriate because it favors neither party unjustly. It represents a compromise between the
Strict Privity approach and the Reasonably Foreseeable Third Party approach. The auditors
are not indeterminately liable for their negligence and the specifically foreseen users are
protected from auditor negligence.
In addition, liability should be limited through enactment of proportionate liability
statutes. Proportionate liability is most appropriate because it provides restitution (money) to
the injured third parties--after all, that should be the primary goal of our legal system--and
does not force the accounting firms to pay restitution for the proportion of damages for
which they were not deemed responsible. I sympathize with the public accounting firms'
fear to litigate. Currently, the end result of litigation could cause the firms to sustain
substantial economic losses not proportionate to their degree of fault. It is obvious to me
that joint & several liability encourages third parties to target public accounting firms for
their well-known "deep pockets" and expansive insurance policies.
Punitive damages should be limited--but not limited so much that they are no longer
"punitive" in nature. The punitive damages should not, however, be awarded to the
plaintiffs or to their attorneys. The damages should be awarded to the appropriate governing
authority so that future abuses can be thwarted.
Usin~ Liti~ation to Brid~e the Ga{)
The current trend to limit the independent auditor's legal liability through additional
litigation is not the best way to bridge the expectation gap. The history of judicial case law
has demonstrated that rulings reached in various courtrooms across the country vary
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dramatically. This widespread variation is not conducive to a sound solution to the liability
crisis. In fact, one might argue that the lack of clear, concise, and definitive liability
guidelines and other problems discussed below are, in and of themselves, major contributors
to the liability crisis.
Attempting to bridge the expectation gap through the legal system is ineffective and
only adds to the expectation gap. Litigation is never the best solution initially. If the dispute
cannot be rectified through alternate measures, then and only then should litigation be
considered as an alternative. The accounting profession believes that accountants should be
provided with a jury of their peers when litigation is necessary. This will ensure that only
educated, learned accounting experts have the ability to decide the case. Like the plaintiffs,
the lay public--the common jurors--is the group that misunderstands public accounting. The
lay public is learned in their own trade or business and the judge is learned in law; it follows
that only an educated accountant is learned in the technical accounting matters discussed
throughout the trial.
Too often, the auditors (as defendants) are pitted against the third party users (the
plaintiffs) in a court of law. The solution to the crisis is not to reduce the auditor's
responsibilities nor is the solution to, in effect, dismiss the assurances expected by third party
financial statement users. The proper and most appropriate changes require compromise
between the parties as well as an increased awareness of the auditor's professional duties.
Continued legal reforms will only lead to a further widening of the expectation gap
and induce conflict between users and auditors. One accountant interviewed believes that
plaintiff's attorneys widen the expectation gap through successful litigation--without regard to
25
merit. Further, he believes that the legal profession has elevated user expectations because
the presence of high expectations ensures the long-term viability of the legal profession.
In sum, judicial changes are not appropriate enough to offer a long-term solution to
the expectation gap nor do they go far enough to make a significant difference in the liability
crisis surrounding the public accounting profession.
Non-litia:ation Ways to Brida:e the Gap
The expectation gap can be bridged by employing methods other than litigation. For
example, the public needs to be better informed as to the purpose and inherent limitations of
an audit. In fact, studies have found that investors who were knowledgeable about business
topics such as accounting and finance were less likely to expect absolute assurance from an
audit. This indicates that education can make the difference between reasonable user
expectations and unreasonable (and unfounded) user expectations. Mr. Robert Mednick
believes that such education could be attained through the use of a supplemental report which
would accompany the audit report and fully describe the usefulness and limitations of an
audit as well as describe the level of assurance provided (Epstein and Geiger 66).
Further alterations and modifications to the standard audit report could focus attention
on basic auditing concepts and notions such as materiality, testing procedures, and reasonable
assurance. In addition, the auditor could issue a range of opinions each providing various
levels of assurance--at a corresponding variety of prices. The shareholders and the Board of
Directors could decide for themselves what level of assurance they desire and analyze the
cost-benefit factors (Epstein and Geiger 63, 66-67).
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issues and technical pronouncements should be discussed at each audit staffing level (Broom
& Brown 33-34).
One lawyer interviewed believes that public accounting firms need to become more
"cost & time conscious." The firms must communicate to their employees that cost and time
are not the only factors that are important during an audit engagement. Quality should
always be the top priority. He would like to see public accounting firms enact total quality
management (TQM) programs that would govern all audit services. He further believes that
if a firm has a true desire to produce quality, meaningful audit reports, that goal is attainable
over the long-run. If the accounting firm listens to what the users want and need, the
accountants can meet user wants and needs in an efficient manner. This may ultimately lead
to a narrowing of the expectation gap.
The client's audit committee should be empowered. The committee should be
involved in all significant auditor-client communications. If the client's management decides
to "opinion shop," then the audit committee should know the reasons and circumstances
behind the desired change (Cockburn 38). Further, stringent rules should be established to
protect the independence of the public accountant. Audit findings should not be
communicated directly to management; rather, they should be communicated to an
independent authority. This will ensure that the auditor-client relationship remains
independent and uncompromised (Plaintiffs Bar 52).
CONCLUSION
Since public accounting emerged nearly a century ago, the financial statement








A recent study indicates that over 47 percent of the general public desires absolute assurance that
the financial statements are free from material misstatement. Further, nearly 70 percent of the
general public expects the independent auditor to provide absolute assurance that no fraud has
been perpetrated. Auditing standards, on the other hand, do not require the financial statement
auditor to provide absolute assurance in any area including the detection of fraud.
I . What level of assurance should a properly performed audit provide to the financial
statement users?
2. Do you see evidence of an expectation gap in practice? Is the increasing number of
litigation claims due to a continuously widening expectation gap?
3. In your opinion, do the financial statement users expect too much assurance from an
audit? Are expectations of absolute assurance reasonable?
4. In your opinion, do the financial statement auditors perform at a sufficiently high level
of quality? Do the auditing standards require that auditors perform at a sufficiently high
level of quality?
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The Independent Auditor as a Defendant
The public accounting profession is at the heart of the litigation crisis. Many accountants believe
that much of the litigation is unwarranted. These professionals also believe that public
accounting firms make good litigation targets because of their liability insurance policies and
"deep pockets. "
5. In your opinion, why are lawsuits against financial statement auditors so prevalent?
6. In terms of severity and frequency of claims, how does the legal liability crisis in public
accounting compare with the litigation crises in other service industries?
The Auditor's Choice
The strict privity approach hinges on the traditional notion of privity of contract. A legally
enforceable relationship exists between the client and the auditor only. No other party is allowed
to recover for auditor negligence.
Judge Cordozo, who established the privity approach, did not want "a thoughtless slip or
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries... to expose
the accountants to a liability in an indeterminant amount for an indeterminant time to an
indeterminant class. "
7. In your opinion, is the strict contractual privity approach appropriate? Which party does
it favor--the auditor or the financial statement user? Does it favor either party unjustly?
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Proportionate Liability
Currently, the legal system operates under a joint & several liability system. One defendant
found guilty of negligence or fraud is required to pay the entire damage judgement if the other
defendants are not financially capable. Each defendant is held fully liable for the assessed
damages without regard to their personal degree of fault.
Current reform efforts are aimed at enacting a proportionate liability system. Damages would
be assessed to each defendant according to his personal, comparative degree of responsibility for
the failure.
8. Is joint & several liability appropriate? Does it encourage unwarranted lawsuits?
9. Would proportionate liability be more appropriate?
The Third Parties' Choice
The foreseeable third party approach expands liability for negligence to anyone whom the
accountants may reasonably foresee as potential financial statement users. This doctrine holds
that a negligent auditor should be completely liable for the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of his actions.
10. In your opinion, is the foreseeable third party approach appropriate? Which party does
it favor--the auditor or the financial statement user? Does it favor either party unjustly?
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-Changes Over Time
Over time, many different judicial rulings have emerged. The rulings vary dramatically from
one jurisdiction to another. Some courts still uphold the strict privity doctrine while others rule
according to the reasonably foreseeable third party approach. In addition, a multitude of other
rulings fall between these two extremes.
11. Would both parties benefit if judicial rulings were consistent among jurisdictions?
12. What, in your opinion, would be the "ideal" judicial ruling?
Are Recent Changes Appropriate?
Currently, the preferred method of resolving legal disputes appears to be through the court
system. The number and dollar amount of court cases have increased exponentially over past
decades.
13. Is litigation the best solution to the legal liability crisis facing the public accounting
profession?
14. Are other remedies available? Do they offer a better solution?
Summary
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